State Law Must Supersede Accreditor Requirements

Members of the North Carolina General Assembly have spent years pursuing higher-education reform and reclaiming authority over the state’s university system. Legislators in other states have done likewise. Yet another actor still quietly shapes higher-education policy: accreditation agencies.

Unelected accreditors and their private organizations influence university governance, hiring decisions, and the mandating of DEI courses and initiatives—all without democratic accountability.

North Carolina is well-positioned to make clear that, when state law conflicts with accreditor “standards” or “regulations,” state law must prevail. It is clear that accreditor overreach undermines state authority. What remains unclear is whether state lawmakers will reassert their lawful authority.

Other states, such as Florida and Texas, have begun to rein in accreditor overreach. With its unified public-university system and reform-minded legislators, North Carolina is well-positioned to lead on this issue—and to make clear that, when state law conflicts with accreditor “standards” or “regulations,” state law must prevail.

Accreditation agencies—staffed by technocrats—are not elected by North Carolinians, nor are they accountable to them. What Accreditors Are and What They’re Not

Throughout the late 19th and early 20th centuries, hundreds of new colleges and universities were founded. That expansion led to the creation of regional accreditation bodies, whose mission was to ensure a basic level of institutional quality. Initially, their role was purely advisory. Over time, however, the regional system laid the foundation for tying federal financial-aid eligibility to accreditation.

Today, there are seven institutional accreditors recognized by the U.S. Department of Education. Historically, they were known as regional accreditors. In 2020, however, the Department eliminated the formal distinction between regional and national accreditation agencies.

Also important are program-level accreditors such as the Accreditation Commission for Education in Nursing (ACEN). While such organizations have no standing to assess an entire institution, they often control licensure, in whole or in part, within their respective occupational fields. For example, some states require that nursing-licensure candidates attend an ACEN-accredited program.

Accreditation agencies are private, voluntary membership organizations. They are not regulators, nor are they constitutional authorities. Their power flows from federal recognition and their role as gatekeepers to federal funding—not from state consent.

As their power and reach expanded over the years, accreditation agencies shifted from an advisory role to a regulatory one. Their “standards” no longer simply measure academic quality and rigor; they increasingly function as policy mandates.

Nevertheless, the fact remains that accreditation agencies—staffed by technocrats—are not elected by North Carolinians, nor are they accountable to them.

How Accreditor Overreach Undermines State Authority 

Accreditors’ transformation from advisory associations into regulatory bodies has expanded their power and influence, placing them in a near-constant posture of institutional overreach—often at the expense of state law and authority.

Accreditation agencies weigh in on a wide range of issues: board-governance structures, presidential searches and removals, administrative staffing, and DEI-related courses and initiatives, among others. This kind of overreach often collides with legislative reform and discourages innovation.

The pattern is familiar. State lawmakers pass reforms, only to see college and university leaders cite accreditors as a veto point. In doing so, administrators effectively outsource the governance of public universities to private organizations.

The pattern is familiar. State lawmakers pass reforms, only to see college and university leaders cite accreditors as a veto point. For example, in North Carolina, the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools Commission on Colleges (SACSCOC) investigated the UNC System during the Nikole Hannah-Jones tenure dispute. The accreditor raised concerns about the influence of the governing board—even though that board is constitutionally authorized and appointed through the legislative process.

More recently, program-specific accreditors have been teaming with UNC-Chapel Hill departments to make use of the “waiver” option built into the UNC System’s anti-DEI policy. The Council on Social Work Education, for instance, requires students to “integrate anti-racist, equity-driven, and inclusive approaches” into practice; to “promote social, racial, and economic justice”; and to integrate “anti-racist, equity-driven, and inclusive approaches” across professional practice. Because these requirements conflict directly with UNC System policy, the social work program must request—and has requested—special permission to proceed.

Citing the possible loss of accreditation, departments and administrators cry foul and wriggle from beneath the law. Similar “waivers” have been requested by nursing and education programs at the flagship institution, and conflicts between UNC System policy and accreditor requirements exist in public health, pharmacy, journalism, business, and medicine, as well. In each case, the game is similar: Responding to state and federal guidelines, UNC System officials attempt to crack down on mandatory viewpoint conformity on campus. Citing the possible loss of accreditation, departments and administrators cry foul and wriggle from beneath the law.

Beyond undermining state authority, accreditors often stifle innovation. The American Bar Association is a prime example. For years, it maintained its monopoly by favoring traditional brick-and-mortar law schools and withholding accreditation from many non-traditional or alternative J.D. programs.

One particularly outdated requirement was that accredited schools maintain a minimum number of physical books in their libraries—regardless of their actual use or relevance.

All of this is to say that North Carolina must find a way to loosen the grip of accreditor overreach—so it can pursue meaningful reform, uphold strong academic standards, and encourage real innovation in higher education.

Baseless Fears and Reality 

Pushback against accreditor overreach—and efforts to break up accreditation monopolies—are often portrayed by the Left as a war on higher education. Arguing that state law should supersede the regulatory power of accreditors is sometimes described as a “secret weapon” in a right-wing attack on the academy. Nothing could be further from the truth.

A common claim among liberal activists and left-leaning professors is that defying accrediting agencies would put federal student aid at risk. It is true that federal law requires accreditation for those schools wishing to access federal loan dollars. But that does not mean institutions must submit unquestioningly to every demand an accreditor makes.

The Department of Education does not mandate accreditor supremacy over state law. Affirming that state law supersedes accreditation regulations would not jeopardize public universities; it would strengthen them by providing much-needed clarity.

Another common criticism is that allowing states to supersede accreditation agencies would “politicize” higher education. That argument falls flat. American colleges and universities are already deeply politicized—and in many cases shaped by DEI mandates pushed by unelected, unaccountable accreditors.

Finally, defenders of the accreditation status quo often retreat to the “academic quality” argument. They claim that accrediting agencies are the guarantors of rigor and standards.

That argument does not withstand scrutiny. Elite institutions such as Harvard and Yale have faced well-documented grade inflation, while students at other colleges struggle with basic math. Accreditation has not prevented either trend.

The Martin Center’s model Accreditation Choice Act explicitly prohibits accreditors from compelling institutions to violate state laws. What’s at Stake and the Case for Reform 

The need for the North Carolina legislature to affirm that state law supersedes accreditor rules is not merely a debate about accreditation—it is about something far larger.

Accreditors are not elected by citizens, nor are they accountable to them. That fact alone raises serious questions about whether their authority aligns with the principles of American self-government. In the Gettysburg Address, President Abraham Lincoln described our system as one “of the people, by the people, for the people.” That principle simply does not apply to the governing structure of accreditation agencies.

This is not a right-wing war on accreditation. It is about restoring constitutional order. With little to no meaningful oversight, accrediting bodies lack democratic accountability—a problem reflected in their DEI mandates and other related requirements. They also blur the lines of separation of powers, acting as private organizations that can effectively override public institutions, including state legislatures.

This raises a simple but unavoidable question: Who should govern public institutions—the state legislatures that fund them and answer to voters or unelected, unaccountable bureaucrats embedded within accreditation agencies?

If the North Carolina General Assembly does not defend its authority to supersede accreditor rules, no one will. By doing so, it can set a model for principled, common-sense reform that other states would follow. A good start would be passing the Martin Center’s model Accreditation Choice Act, which explicitly prohibits accreditors from compelling institutions to violate state laws.

Just as important, institutions of higher education should be prohibited from invoking accreditor standards or decisions as a way to evade statutory requirements or stall future reforms.

If enacted, these measures would bring much-needed clarity for everyone involved: trustees, administrators, university presidents, and lawmakers alike.

This is not a right-wing war on accreditation. It is about restoring constitutional order in public higher education.

Jovan Tripkovic is communications manager at the James G. Martin Center for Academic Renewal.